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WHETHER, WHEN, AND HOW TO TAX THE
PROFITS OF CONTROLLED FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS
John P. Steines, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the choices of how the United States could tax the
earnings of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) are these:
(1) exempt the income from tax permanently; (2) accrue the
income currently and grant either a credit or deduction for
foreign taxes; or, (3) defer taxation until repatriation and allow
a credit or deduction for foreign taxes at that time. The pres-
ent system reflects aspects of all three approaches, but mainly
accords deferral with a foreign tax credit upon repatriation,
except for income taxed currently (actually or effectively) under
anti-deferral regimes such as subpart F and the passive for-
eign investment company (PFIC) rules. The essential premise
which the present system rests upon, and variously compro-
mises, is that residence-based, export-neutral taxation is fair
and efficient, provided that it alleviates international double
taxation and prohibits deferral in appropriate cases.
David Rosenbloom's paper' examines the U.S. system in
light of the traditional criteria-fairness, efficiency, and sim-
plicity-and, with an emphasis on simplicity and a refreshingly
congenial approach to fairness and efficiency, concludes that a
significant portion of CFC profits should be exempt from U.S.
taxation and that much of the balance should be taxed current-
ly, with only a deduction for foreign taxes. Before addressing
the paper, I would like to begin with a thoroughly unrealistic
situation and then build upon it the complications that have
resulted in the inordinately intricate complex of rules in place
* The author is a Professor of Law at the New York University School of
Law. He has taught classes in basic personal and corporate income tax to J.D.
students, as well as a wide variety of LL.M courses in corporate and partnership
taxation, tax accounting, international aspects of U.S. taxation, and tax policy. A
former Editor-in-Chief of the TAX LAW REVIEW, Professor Steines also serves as
counsel to Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP. He is a graduate of Ohio State Universi-
ty School of Law and New York University School of Law.
1. H. David Rosenbloom, From the Bottom' Up: Taxing the Income of Con-
trolled Foreign Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1525 (2001).
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'today. The purpose is to suggest that, while present rules are
unforgivably complicated and proposals like Mr. Rosenbloom's
deserve serious consideration, there may not be room for much
improvement short of retreating from income taxation in favor
of wage, consumption, or wealth-based tax systems.2 Unless
such a bold direction is taken, and I am not suggesting that it
should be, the best prescription may be for modest, incremen-
tal change.
II. BALANCING RESIDENCE AND SOURCE CLAIMS
A. An Unrealistic Situation
Imagine an unreal world of two states, R and S. R is a
bedroom state with personal residences, schools, hospitals,
cultural institutions, and civic facilities to support them, but
very little business activity. S is across the river and houses
the businesses where the citizens of R work and invest capital
and ideas. S has its necessary civic support facilities, but rela-
tively few people reside in S. Given the small population in S,
most of the market for the products of S business is in R.
There are no corporations in R or S; they do not allow them.
Both R and S need tax revenue to support their functions, but
most of the income generated by their economy would be
sourced in S, according to L, a lawyer living in R who has read
a futuristic novel about international taxation. A pure resi-
dence-based system would jeopardize S's existence, whereas a
pure source-based system would jeopardize R's.
Compromise of principles is imperative if R and S are to
co-exist. R and S have not heard of formulary taxation and
agree that certain items (e.g., wages) will be taxable only in S
and other items (e.g., interest and royalties on loans and ideas
provided to S business) will be taxable only in R. R and S
agree that enterprise profits of S business should be split even-
ly since production takes place in S but the market is in R. In
light of the income allocation they have agreed to, R and S set
their respective tax rates at levels sufficient to enable them to
provide desired government services.
R and S reach enlightenment and introduce corporations,
2. See David Bradford, Blueprints for International Tax Reform, 26 BROOK. J.
INTIL L. 1449 (2001).
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taxable as separate entities. Many of the businesses in S incor-
porate, some under the law of R, where most of the sharehold-
ers live, but many under the law of S. Some of the S corpora-
tions are controlled by R residents, some by R corporations,
and some by residents of S with minority ownership by R resi-
dents. Subsequently, S amends its corporate tax law to provide
for integration of corporate and shareholder taxation for some
of its corporations. Later, electronic commerce and derivative
financial instruments appear on the scene. L talks the R legis-
lature into allowing corporations to elect to be treated as trans-
parent for tax purposes. Planning to avoid taxes, something
relatively rare in the past, becomes common. The citizens of R
and S multiply, relocate, and form several new states where
they replicate their experiences in R and S, except that most of
these new states have a mixed economy, resembling an amal-
gam of R and S rather than one or the other. Some of these
states hold themselves out as low-tax jurisdictions where busi-
nesses can incorporate and minimize worldwide tax.
The once simple resolution worked out by R and S seems
hopelessly confused. Over time the states respond to these
developments in deliberate fashion by unilaterally and selec-
tively adopting and refining sundry versions of source rules,
expense allocation rules, foreign tax credit rules, exemption
rules, transfer pricing rules, anti-expatriation rules, anti-defer-
ral rules, and elective transparency rules-each complicated
and none without flaws-and by entering into treaties to coor-
dinate their systems. Tax planning becomes more aggressive,
facilitated by technological and financial innovation. The states
suspect that their systems are not working fairly and efficient-
ly and that tax is being improperly avoided. However, they are
not sure what changes to make first, recognizing that each
part of the system depends on another.
B. How to React?
This illustration captures a large part of the challenge
presently besetting makers of international tax policy. It began
with a simple tussle between residence and source taxation,
and showed, I think, that there is no such thing as pure resi-
dence taxation. There are numerous legitimate questions about
where to source certain types of income, particularly those
arising in electronic commerce and financial innovation, and
1597
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
whether corporations should be deemed resident where they
are organized or managed without regard to the nationality of
their shareholders or locations of their business.3 But once
those questions are answered, and regardless of how mechani-
cally they are answered,4 some balancing of residence and
source claims is essential in order to avoid double taxation.
Where the residence country claims a secondary right to tax,
the question remains whether it should be exercised on a cur-
rent or deferred basis, and what level of double tax relief (cred-
it or deduction5 of foreign tax) should be afforded. So, without
getting bogged down in residence versus source semantics, the
questions are whether the United States should exercise its
right to impose residual tax on the income of CFC's (to exempt
or not to exempt), and if so then when (to defer or not to defer)
and how (choice of accrual model and whether to credit or not
to credit foreign tax).
C. The Appropriate Role of Efficiency
At this juncture, it seems appropriate to comment on the
role of efficiency in this endeavor. Much of the debate on defer-
ral is dominated by abstract considerations of global efficiency
in the allocation of savings and investment. Advocates of capi-
tal export neutrality (CEN) argue that, due to empirical evi-
dence indicating that direct investment decisions are more
elastic than savings decisions-that investment decisions are
more responsive to tax burdens than are savings decisions, or,
3. Some argue for absolute irrelevance of a corporation's residence, at least
insofar as residence is determined by place of organization, and that a corporation,
including a U.S. corporation, should be taxed by a country only with respect to
income earned in that country-a strict territorial approach. See Herman Bouma,
Two Arguments Against an Alternative View of Deferral, 20 TAX NOTES INTL 875
(2000).
4. Many "source" rules reflect a default concession that the residence country
has the primary right to tax the item in question, often because no other country
exercises taxation of the item, rather than a principled judgment that the item is
attributable to activity in the residence jurisdiction. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 865(a)
(1994). The same can be said of consensual treaty-relaxed or eliminated withhold-
ing rates applicable to portfolio flows that are attributable to activity in the
payor's jurisdiction.
5. Where double tax relief is provided in the form of a deduction for foreign
tax, it is somewhat misleading to speak of a "secondary" right and "double tax
relief," because the residence country cedes no primacy to the source country and
double tax is avoided only on pre-tax income dedicated to foreign tax.
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in other words, that the demand for capital is more elastic
than the supply of capital-worldwide efficiency is best served
by a tax system that neutralizes the investor's decision to
make direct investment at home or abroad, notwithstanding
that such a system may distort savings decisions. In its purest
form, CEN implies no taxation at source coupled with current
residence taxation, or taxation at source coupled with current
residence taxation and an unlimited foreign tax credit. Advo-
cates of capital import neutrality (CIN), which is believed to
distort investment decisions but to result in an efficient alloca-
tion of savings as between present and future consumption,
argue that companies investing in a given location are not on
competitively equal ground unless they bear equal tax burdens
on the investment, regardless of where they reside. CIN im-
plies a territorial system. CEN and CIN converge only when
tax rates in all countries are equal. Given the belief that in-
vestment is more elastic than savings, theory holds that CEN
is more efficient than CIN because its resulting efficiency gains
from investment exceed its resulting distortion of savings,
whereas the investment distortions of CIN exceed its savings
efficiency gains. The U.S. system of limited deferral is a com-
promise between CEN and CIN, as are most tax systems.,
Two observations about efficiency are pertinent. First, the
point made by Michael Graetz in another paper presented at
the symposium,6 that global efficiency is not necessarily a prop-
er objective of U.S. tax policy. Why shouldn't U.S. policy serve
national economic interests instead of global economic inter-
ests? This provocative point is part of a mosaic that national
welfare and other national goals and policies should not be
subjugated to pursuit of global efficiency in making U.S. inter-
national tax policy. Second, and this is a narrower point, eco-
nomic analysis simply does not seem to have reached a level of
sophistication that captures actual circumstances to the degree
necessary to accord it primacy in making international tax
policy. To be fair, it attempts to know what may be demon-
strated theoretically in a confined atmosphere, but which may
not be accurately quantifiable when theoretical constraints are
lifted, by reason of the insuperable difficulty of incorporating
6. Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles,
Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BRoOK. J. INTL L. 1357 (2001).
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into the models all of the numerous cross currents and biases
inherent in tax rules that depend on a taxpayer's particular
legal and financial structure and position at a given point in
time.'
Thus, emancipated at least somewhat from the stricture of
pursuing global economic efficiency, analysis of the question of
whether to exempt, accrue, or defer CFC earnings can proceed
in light of balanced sensitivity to the traditional criteria of fair-
ness, efficiency in a more general sense, and simplicity. Before
continuing, it is worth noting that, despite the ad hoc manner
in which the rules have responded to perceived threats and the
unnecessary complexity of them, the possibility cannot be ex-
cluded that they stack up decently against reform proposals on
a cost/benefit analysis. Reform proposals should be scrutinized
for claims of simplification, lest promised simplification result
in more complexity. Any major reform will require time and
scarce government resources to understand, implement, and
enforce, not to mention the cost of taxpayer understanding and
compliance and the risk of unforeseen economic and revenue
effects. The benefits should be rather clear before the venture
is undertaken.
III. THE PROPOSAL: EXEMPTION VERSUS ACCRUAL WITH
DEDUCTION OF FOREIGN TAX
Writing on a clean slate, David Rosenbloom begins with
the proposition that residence-based taxation easily is justifi-
able on straightforward notions of fairness and efficiency, but
that such finding implies nothing for respecting the separate
identity of a CFC. He regards use of a CFC structure by con-
trolling resident shareholders essentially as a tax election
without significant nontax consequences-an election that need
not be respected for tax purposes, Section 902's indirect credit
being an indication of such disregard in current law. He does
not extend this reasoning to non-controlling shareholders be-
cause, for them, the corporate form is likely to entail a delega-
tion or sharing of authority different from what would obtain
7. In an informative paper reviewing the economics literature on the effects
of deferral, the author was admirably candid in pointing out factors excluded from
the models and in emphasizing the tentative nature of the conclusion to be drawn
from them. See Robert Altshuler, Recent Developments in the Debate on Deferral,
20 TAx NoTEs INTIL 1579 (2000).
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in a non-corporate investment. Nor does he believe that disre-
garding a CFC requires, in the name of consistency, sharehold-
er integration of taxes paid by U.S. corporations. CFC's and
U.S. corporations, in his judgment, raise different issues and
may be treated differently.
At this point, he gets to the heart of the matter by raising
the necessity of alleviating international double taxation, ei-
ther through an exemption or credit system. In a credit sys-
tem, the theoretically correct approach is to allow credits onA an
item-by-item basis with no cross-crediting, but it would be
hopelessly impractical for taxpayers and the government. The
next best solution, cross-crediting within boundaries delineated
by geography or income categories, with taxpayers inevitably
seeking the widest boundaries in order to maximize cross-cred-
iting, is complicated. Respecting the separate identity of CFC's
aggravates the complexity by requiring look-through rules and
intricate applications of loss-tracing and expense allocation
rules. This is especially true when credits arise upon repatria-
tion after an interim period during which the CFC and its
foreign affiliates have had an opportunity to manipulate cate-
gories through self-dealing. The problem, as Mr. Rosenbloom
sees it, is not that the rules are irrational, but that they are so
complicated as virtually to guarantee inconsistent and, there-
fore, unfair application. Unconvinced that abolishing deferral
meaningfully would alleviate the complexity of cross-crediting
rules, he concludes that the beast to be slain is not just the
separateness of CFC's, but the foreign tax credit itself.
He suggests exemption as a better alternative. Specifically,
with respect to controlling shareholders, the proposal is for
exemption of business income earned by a CFC (and by branch
investment as well), when earned and when repatriated, that
is attributable to a permanent establishment maintained in a
country designated on a list confined to those countries that
have mature tax systems-countries that would be likely to tax
the income at a substantial rate.' The list would be compiled
8. The paper speaks of granting exemption to "resident taxpayers" on direct
foreign investment and on direct investment by the taxpayer's controlled CFC. It
is not clear whether this reference to resident taxpayers includes resident individu-
als. If a resident individual can make a foreign direct investment and enjoy ex-
emption, then it might seem necessary to pass the benefit of exemption to that
same individual when he makes the same investment through a U.S. corporation
1601
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primarily through the treaty process, subject to legislative
oversight, and regularly updated to take account of changes in
practice in the listed countries.
CFC business income earned in other countries (or in
listed countries to the extent not attributable to a permanent
establishment there) would be subject to current taxation in
the United States and there would be a deduction, not a credit,
for foreign taxes. The same treatment would apply to passive
income. In special cases, a direct foreign tax credit would be
available, but only by treaty.
As to non-controlling shareholders, which is not the focus
of the paper, passive income earned through a foreign corpora-
tion could be subject to rules akin to the PFIC rules. As to
business income earned through non-controlled foreign corpo-
rations in a listed country, the suggestion is to exempt from
U.S. taxation dividends received by a U.S. corporate sharehold-
er, or, at worst, to tax the dividend but allow a deduction or
perhaps a direct credit for withholding tax.
IV. OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROPOSAL
A. Exemption
Focusing first on exemption of business income earned in
listed countries, the economic and revenue effects would not
seem great if the assumption is that there would be little re-
sidual U.S. tax. However, if there were taxes in excess of the
U.S. rate in such countries, the ability to cross-credit such
taxes against low-taxed business income from non-listed coun-
tries would be lost. In this situation, the proposal loses some of
its claim to efficiency and fairness. Despite Mr. Rosenbloom's
expressed dislike of elections, this may be an argument for
allowing an election to stay on the credit system, which of
course would detract significantly from the simplicity gains of
the proposal.
The list approach itself resembles the high-tax exception to
that owns the comparable branch or CFC. Otherwise, the individual can avoid
U.S. tax if he invests directly, but not if he does so through a U.S. corporation.
Passing the benefit of exemption on to individual shareholders of a U.S. corpora-
tion has implications for operation of the classical system in the United States.
See William Burke, Deferral and Subpart F Revisited, 536 TAX F. 23, 23-24 (1999).
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subpart F,9 in that income bearing a substantial tax is exempt
altogether (as opposed to being immune to accrual under
subpart F). In practice, the list probably would turn out to be a
proxy for a minimum foreign tax rate, with the important
difference that substantiality of a country's tax apparently
would be determined on a system-wide basis (as opposed to an
item-by-item or taxpayer-by-taxpayer basis). An unattractive
feature of the list approach is that, like the rules governing
creditability of foreign tax,10 to some degree it forces confor-
mance by countries who wish to attract U.S. investment by
getting on the list.
As to simplicity gains, the proposal as applied to business
income from listed countries, has the potential for significant,
but not dramatic, progress. Virtually no rules would need to be
more complicated than they are today, although their emphasis
would be redirected and some could be simpler and smaller in
scope." The greatest obvious benefit would be removal of list-
ed country operations from the morass of foreign tax credit
rules and consequent elimination of the incentive to engage in
credit-seeking transactions of the type described in Notice 98-
5.12 However, there would be a need for ordering rules, simi-
lar to those in Section 959, to cover situations where exempt
income is intermingled with nonexempt income as it is distrib-
uted up a chain of subsidiaries.
More generally, unless the United States were to relax its
base-protecting vigilance, some might say neurosis, or taxpay-
ers were to abandon efforts to shift income to where the tax is
9. See I.R.C. § 954(b)(4) (1994).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2 (as amended in 1996).
11. Presumably, subpart F could be eliminated, but it would have to be re-
placed with an accrual system for non-exempt income. See infra Part IV.C and
text accompanying note 20. Expense allocation rules would have to be retained in
order to disallow deductions attributable to exempt income, as opposed to their
primary function under current law of policing allocation of costs to foreign-source
income in order to monitor the foreign tax credit limitation. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 265
(1994). Transfer pricing rules still would be necessary, even if, as Mr. Rosenbloom
observes, they would be of reduced importance. Section 367 could be narrowed and
simplified in that inbound transfers from exempt or non-exempt jurisdictions pre-
sumably would not result in U.S. tax (the foreign income is either exempt or al-
ready has been taxed in the U.S.) and outbound transfers to non-exempt jurisdic-
tions would not facilitate avoidance of U.S. tax. However, there would be a contin-
uing need to police outbound transfers to exempt jurisdictions and to retain §
367(d) for that purpose. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 367(d) (1994).
12. I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334.
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lowest, it is not hard to imagine the proposal lurching toward
nearly the same level of complexity that exists today, minus
the foreign tax credit. Only the pressure points would differ.
Instead of taxpayers searching for low-taxed income not sub-
ject to subpart F, they would search for low-taxed income at-
tributable to a permanent establishment in a listed country. If
the listed country is doing its job, which presumably is why it
would be listed in the first place, such income should be hard
to find. But taxpayers would try, and the United States might
feel compelled to step in where the listed country exercises less
vigilance, possibly presaging another saga similar to Notice 98-
11" and its aftermath. Nevertheless, the proposal does elimi-
nate the foreign tax credit for operations in listed countries
without increasing, if not meaningfully reducing, complexity in
other respects. For that reason alone it merits consideration.
B. Accrual with Deduction Versus Credit
The troubling aspect of the proposal concerns treatment of
business income from non-listed countries. Such income would
be accrued currently for U.S. tax purposes and associated for-
eign taxes would be deductible (a rule often associated with
"national neutrality"), not creditable. It is not clear why busi-
ness income taxes should be deductible just because they are
generated in low-tax jurisdictions, nor why accrual and non-
creditability with respect to income from non-listed countries is
a necessary complement to the proposal on income from listed
countries. I suppose the response is that that is the price of
simplicity, but the price seems quite high, 4 and is likely to be
regarded as offensive by non-listed countries whom we have no
wish to offend.
Whatever might be said about the efficiency and anti-com-
petitive effects, ending deferral for low-taxed income does en-
hance fairness. But denying a foreign tax credit seems unduly
13. I.R.S. Notice 98-11, 1998-1 C.B. 433. See also I.R.S. Notice 98-35, 1998-2
C.B. 34; Prop. Treas. Reg. 113909-98, 64 Fed. Reg. 37727 (July 13, 1998).
14. A non-creditable 10% foreign tax in a non-listed country translates into a
41.5% overall rate, as compared with the rate in effect in another country, say
25%, which is substantial enough to get that country on the list. A minimum tax
approach, with a credit instead of a deduction, would equate the current tax bur-
dens on investment in the two countries. See infra Part IV.C, text accompanying
note 19.
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to elevate simplicity over fairness for those who operate in
non-listed countries. Moreover, the simplicity gains of replac-
ing a credit with a deduction must be weighed against the
complexity cost of implementing an accrual model.
In the same vein, the core proposal to exempt income from
listed countries presents an opportunity to simplify the foreign
tax credit itself. If income bearing a substantial foreign tax is
exempt, it follows that other income would be low-taxed rela-
tive to U.S. rates. In other words, virtually all taxpayers with
non-exempt income would be in an excess limitation posture.
Leaving aside transactions engineered to generate excess cred-
its at little or no economic cost, the type aimed at by Notice 98-
5,15 cross-crediting opportunities virtually would be nonexis-
tent. Such a condition would permit a limitation system con-
sisting of only two baskets: One for transactions of the Notice
98-5 ilk, and a residual basket for all other activity. In addi-
tion, although a simplified credit system could be enacted
alone or in combination with this extra step, further simplifi-
cation could be achieved by allowing a credit for all foreign
taxes, not just income taxes. The income tax requirement dates
back to the early period (1918-21) when there was no limita-
tion on foreign tax credits. So long as the United States em-
ploys its own income tax accounting principles to determine
the foreign tax credit limitation,16 confining a credit to income
taxes is unnecessary. 17
Admittedly, permitting cross-crediting for whatever high
taxes on non-exempt income which might exist (e.g., taxes on
natural resource extraction in non-listed countries) and allow-
ing credits for non-income taxes raises the specter of runaway
credits, which resulted in the rules defining creditable taxes
and disallowing credits for "taxes" that are subsidized or that
pay for specific economic benefits.'" These concerns could be
alleviated by adding a third basket for passive income, and by
postponing removal of the income tax requirement of credit-
ability until the Notice 98-5 issue is resolved and the effects of
a two- or three-basket system are clearer. The main point is
15. I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334.
16. See United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U.S. 132 (1992).
17. See Joseph Isenbergh, The Foreign Tax Credit: Royalties, Subsidies, and
Creditable Taxes, 39 TAX L. REV. 227, 285-95 (1984).
18. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2 - §1.901-2A (as amended in 1996).
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that exemption of income in listed countries, with a simplified
credit for other income, is a realistic and more attractive pack-
age than accompanying exemption with accrual of other in-
come with only a deduction for foreign tax.
C. Accrual Model
An alternative to accrual as a means of dealing with low-
taxed business income would be to impose an overall minimum
tax on CFC profits, 9 either as part of, or in place of, existing
subpart F, with the United States collecting from controlling
shareholders their share of the excess of the minimum tax over
the foreign taxes actually paid by the CFC. Upon repatriation,
the shareholders would receive a credit for the foreign taxes
and for the minimum taxes previously paid. Such a system
would be complicated, but less complicated than implementing
a full accrual model and, as argued above, fairer than allowing
only a deduction for foreign tax.
The proposal ends deferral for non-listed business opera-
tions without specifying precisely how the accrual model would
work. More than one type of model is available.0 Where the
CFC is wholly owned, it could be disregarded entirely, in the
same manner as single-owner foreign entities may be disre-
garded under current law by "checking the box."21 But, where
the CFC has multiple shareholders, disregarding the entity is
problematic. In such a case, the CFC's earnings and profits
could be treated as a constructive dividend. If the CFC gener-
ated capital gains, such an approach would have the disadvan-
tage of failing to pass through capital gains to non-corporate
members of the control group, contrary to treatment under the
PFIC rules where an election to be taxed currently is in effect.
Flow-through of capital gains should be preserved in order to
maintain parity with domestic investment.
Another suggestion is to use a modified subchapter K (the
19. Several other countries employ a minimum tax approach in their anti-de-
ferral rules. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Logic of Subpart F: A Comparative Ap-
proach, 79 TAX NOTES 1775 (1998).
20. A group discussion indicating general agreement that full accrual is im-
practical and problematic for other reasons appears in Transcript From the Sympo-
sium, Globalizdtion and the Taxation of Foreign Investment, 20 TAX NOTES INL
1268, 1277-82 (2000).
21. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2) - § 301.7701-3(c) (1999).
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partnership rules) as an accrual model for foreign corporations,
regardless of whether the corporation qualified as a CFC under
Section 957 and regardless of the U.S. shareholder's percent-
age ownership.22 This would make life very difficult for U.S.
shareholders of a foreign joint venture corporation which also
has foreign shareholders unless the modified subchapter K is
very different from the one I know.
Subchapter K, in addition to policing allocations for sub-
stantial economic effect, contains numerous complicated rules
dealing with built-in gains,' transfers of property into and
out of the entity,' basis adjustments,' and the ability of
members to amortize contributed intangibles.26 Sometimes,
there is also the issue of whether contributed intangibles are
"property" within the meaning of Section 721, and, if not,
whether a "profits" interest in the partnership is necessary to
preclude current taxation. Under current law, if a CFC
forms a non-corporate joint venture with a foreign partner, the
CFC, for purposes of managing its earnings and profits, pre-
sumably has to apply subchapter K in order to determine its
share of profits from the joint venture entity, which can em-
broil the CFC in arcane, contentious discussions with its for-
eign partner over why certain allocations must be provided for
in their agreement. The foreign partner owes no U.S. tax, but
is concerned that provisions beyond its advisor's understanding
22. See Robert Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming & Stephen Shay, Getting Serious
About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV.
455, 508-16 (1999). This proposal would permit less-than-10% shareholders to defer
tax until a liquidity event, with an interest charge, along the lines of the PFIC
rules.
23. See I.R.C. § 704(c) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3 (as amended in 1997).
24. See I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B), 707(a), 731(c), 737, 751(b) (1994).
25. See I.R.C. §§ 734(b), 743(b) (1994).
26. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3, § 1.197-2(g)(4), and § 1.197-2(h)(12) (as amended
in 2000).
27. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211
(Ct. Cl. 1973); Rev. Rul. 69-156, 1969-1 C.B. 101. A "profits" interest, well recog-
nized as precluding current income in the context of partnership interests issued
for services, has no claim in a current liquidation at book value and, therefore,
precludes income even if the intangibles are not considered property for purposes
of § 721. See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. The Clinton Administration pro-
posed to resolve this issue by treating intangibles as property even where less
than all substantial rights therein have been transferred to the partnership. DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR
2001 REVENUE PRoPosALs, 150 (2000).
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might adversely affect its economic share of what seemed to it
a straightforward deal. The foreign partner doesn't understand
why it's an "anti-churning partner" and what "remedial alloca-
tions" and "capital shifts" are, and rightfully wants no part of
them without exacting concessions. The same problem will
occur, but with immediate tax stakes, where the CFC must
apply subchapter K, not to manage earnings and profits, but
rather to determine the currently taxable distributive shares of
its U.S. shareholders. Subchapter K is not the right accrual
model; it is too encrusted with operational detail to export to
"partners" abroad.
Another aspect of importance in selecting an accrual model
is whether transactions between the foreign corporation and its
owners would be respected and given effect, or disregarded."
Constructive dividend or partnership treatment would seem to
call for recognizing such transactions, if consistency with do-
mestic rules is desired, whereas such transactions would be
ignored if the foreign corporation'is disregarded. One commen-
tator recommends treating both actual branch operations and
foreign corporations as subsidiaries (with constructive dividend
treatment) in order to have harmonious treatment of inter-
company dealings, regardless of how foreign operations are
structured.29
V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Rosenbloom's paper is an extremely valuable reminder
that it is never too late to think anew about old problems.
Having said that, I end where I began: There may be little
room to improve the system significantly without retreating
from an income tax. Standing alone, the proposal to exempt
business income from listed countries has much to commend it
on equity, efficiency, and simplicity grounds. But the proposed
treatment of business income from non-listed countries surren-
28. A related question is whether .§ 367(d) would impute royalties from a
disregarded CFC, and, if not, whether the host country might be inclined to im-
pose withholding tax on outbound royalties in contravention of normal treaty prac-
tice. See Charles Kingson, Leonardo da Vinci and the 861 Regulations, 26 BROOK.
J. INTL L. 1565 (2001) (commenting on H. David Rosenbloom, From the Bottom
Up: Taxing the Income of Controlled Foreign Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
1525 (2001)).
29. Burke, supra note 8, at 25-28.
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ders too much equity for the simplicity gain of getting rid of
the foreign tax credit, and imposes too much complexity for the
equity gain of full accrual.
Perhaps I am proving Mr. Rosenbloom's point that it is
hard to "unlearn" prior experience. Nevertheless, I would pre-
fer a reform which takes the proposal on exemption for listed
countries, but which retains deferral (other than for passive
income) with a simplified foreign tax credit for other income,
shored up by a minimum tax approach in addition to, or ideal-
ly in place of, existing subpart F.

